The Onboard Diagnostics Port (OBD) has been required for all cars sold in the US since 1996 and in Europe since 2001. Prompted by the need to simplify the diagnosis of increasingly complex emission control systems, the OBD-II improved on previous implementations by providing standardized condition codes for the auto repair and tuning markets. Standardized access to this data has helped spawn a robust aftermarket of plug-in devices to allow consumers to monitor their teen drivers, earn discounts from insurers, or gain insights into the performance and health of their vehicles. Similar devices allow fleet managers to monitor the condition, performance and behavior of their vehicles. Nearly all of these dongles offer a wireless connection for the convenience of their customers. Unfortunately, a wireless connection also provides a potential path for hackers to gain entry to the car’s internal networks.
Last year Americans purchased slightly less than 200,000 electric vehicles which are supported by approximately 47,000 US charging stations, according to Statista. The growth rate of electric vehicles is high and shows no signs of slowing down.
Most drivers place full trust in their GPS navigation systems to guide them to their destination. But what if those navigation systems can’t be trusted.
OnBoard Security’s Chief Technology Officer, Dr. William Whyte, has been involved in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications security for nearly 20 years. He is the editor of the IEEE 1609.2 security standard and has consulted for numerous automaker, the US Dept. of Transportation (DOT) and transportation organizations around the world. He is frequently asked to explain V2X security and give insights on potential vulnerabilities in the system.
At the Automated Vehicles Symposium (AVS) 2017, I addressed a plenary talk to the ~1,500 attendees, stating that even though it is unanimously considered as paramount, cybersecurity is still an after-thought. Or at least it still feels like it. Indeed, for the last two AVS editions, the cybersecurity breakout session reported similar open challenges, but no real changes have been seen since. In order to move the security needle, we took a different approach and didn't organize a cybersecurity breakout session. Instead, we identified that the missing components were the lack of inputs coming from the community of experts. To be able to build a more resilient system, cybersecurity experts should know about the limitations of each subsystem, and possible "nightmare scenarios".
Topics: DSRC, Connected Vehicles, Research, V2V, TPM, Trusted Computing, TSS, Cyber Security, Autonomous Vehicles, Embedded Security, Regulation, Automotive, V2X, Internet of Things, Privacy, Quantum Computing, Cryptography, NTRU, BCAM, SCMS
Car makers use cryptographic keys for a variety of purposes, including Over-The-Air (OTA) software updates, security immobilizers, inter-module communications, and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication security. Key Management Systems (KMS) are very complex, as the manufacturer has to manage dozens of keys for each car model, both at production and when new components are introduced during repairs, and they must maintain these keys over the long lifetime of a car. Key Management is a daunting task.
On Friday October 21, 2016, Dyn was subjected to two large Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against their internet-address lookup Managed DNS infrastructure. The attackers used Mirai botnets launched from over 100,000 endpoints including cameras, DVRs and baby monitors to generate the significant volume of attack traffic. Affected services included Amazon, Spotify, Netflix and the New York Times.